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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The literature on incomplete contracts (see Hart (1995) and Tirole (1999) for
surveys) has provided signiﬁcant insight into how assignment of ownership of
productive assets bears on economic outcomes. In this short paper I do not
intend to quarrel with any of the literature’s conceptual accomplishments, which
I regard as valuable and interesting. Nevertheless, I wish to take issue with some
of the theoretical foundations underlying this line of work.
The points that I will make are not new; most have been made in one form or
another in Maskin and Tirole (1999) or Maskin and Moore (1999)1.H o w e v e r ,i t
is fair to say that the discussion so far has taken place at a rather technical level.
Herein, I will try to present some of the main ideas in a reasonably informal
way.
2 Incomplete Contracts
If I am to criticize the incomplete contracts literature, I must ﬁrst say what an
incomplete contract is. Rather than attempting a precise deﬁnition—although
such attempts have been made—I will consider a contract to be “incomplete”
if it is not as fully contingent on the “state of the world” (the resolution of
uncertainty about the future) as the parties to the contract might like it to be2.
1The latter paper is not concerned with incomplete contracts per se, but develops tech-
niques that I use in the mechanism of Section 4.
2This deﬁnition is so broad that it covers many contracts in the literature that are not
normally considered “incomplete,” e.g., insurance contracts with adverse selection. But for
my purposes, I need not reﬁne it further.
2Imagine, for example, that two agents plan to trade at some time in the
future. Before this happens, they must know the characteristics of the good to
be exchanged. Suppose that these characteristics are still undetermined at the
time the parties negotiate their contract. Then diﬀerent states of the world will
correspond to diﬀerent characteristic speciﬁc a t i o n s . A n di ft h et e r m so ft r a d e
in the contract do not depend on the state, the contract might reasonably be
called “incomplete.”
The literature oﬀers three main reasons for contractual incompleteness:
(1) Some aspects of the state of the world may not be common knowledge or
commonly observable; in particular, whoever is responsible for enforcing
the contract (e.g., the court) may not be able to ascertain these aspects
(in which case, we say that the aspects are “unveriﬁable”);
(2) Some aspects of the state may be unforeseen or indescribable by the parties
in advance (perhaps because there is simply too vast a range of possibilities
to think about);
(3) Even if certain aspects are foreseen, writing them into a contract may be
too costly.
Let me put aside reason (3) right away. This is not to deny that it has
validity, but only that we have not yet discovered a widely accepted principle
for gauging the cost of specifying contingencies (see, however, the interesting
work by Anderlini and Felli (1994) and MacLeod (1995)). This issue seems
intimately related to that of “bounded rationality,” a topic that I touch on in
3the conclusion.
As for reason (2), I will argue that, for a broad range of models used in the
incomplete contracts literature, unforeseeability or indescribability “does not
matter.” More speciﬁcally, I will illustrate why the following theorem (some-
times called the Irrelevance Theorem and stated here rather loosely) holds:
Theorem If parties can assign a probability distribution to their possible
future payoﬀs, then the fact that they cannot describe the possible physical states
(e.g., the possible characteristics of the good to be traded) in advance is irrelevant
to welfare. That is, the parties can devise a contract that leaves them no worse
oﬀ than were they able to describe the physical states ex ante.
I should stress that, this theorem does not imply that the parties can do
as well as though they had fully contingent contracts, because reason (1) for
incompleteness may still pertain (see footnote 5 below for an illustration of this
point). I claim only that agents should not care that states are indescribable3.
3 An Illustrative Model
Rather than trying to make the above statement of the Irrelevance Theorem
more precise at a general level, I will merely invoke an example that is typical
of many models studied in the incomplete contracts literature4.
3This is putting the claim too strongly. Maskin and Tirole (1999) state the hypotheses of
the Irrelevance Theorem more carefully and show that, if they are violated, indescribability
can matter. However, these hypotheses are nearly always satisﬁed by models in the literature.
4In some respects this example is closest to the model of Che and Hausch (1999), in
which, as here, an agent may enhance the other party’s payoﬀ by his own investment. Che
and Hausch, however, do not focus on the issue of indescribability.
4Suppose that agents 1 and 2 contemplate exchanging a single indivisible good
that agent 1 will produce and agent 2 will consume. There are three dates.
At the ﬁrst date—date 0—the two agents negotiate the terms on which the
good will be produced and exchanged. The outcome of the negotiation is a
contract.
At date 1, agent 1 undertakes R&D that determines the set of characteristics
of the good and hence the value v of the good to agent 2. At the same time,
agent 2 invests in the development of an intermediate input that will facilitate
the production process for agent 1 and therefore lower his production cost c.A s
one would expect, v is an increasing function v(e1) of agent 1’s R&D expenditure
e1 and c is a decreasing function c(e2) of agent 2’s investment e2 (the more
investment, the better the properties of the intermediate good, and so the lower
the production cost).
Finally, at date 2, the characteristics of the good and the properties of the
intermediate input are realized; agent 1 produces this good using that input and
delivers it to agent 2; and agent 2 pays agent 1 as prescribed by the contract.
Agent 1’s payoﬀ can be expressed as
u1 (p − c(e2) − e1),
and agent 2’s payoﬀ is
u2 (v(e1) − p − e2),
where p i st h ep r i c eo ft h eg o o da n du1 and u2 are von Neumann-Morgenstern
5utility functions.
I shall assume, as is standard, that the investments, e1 and e2, and the
private beneﬁts and costs, v and c, cannot be veriﬁed by the contract enforcer,
although they are commonly known by the two agents at date 2.
In this model, a state of the world corresponds to the characteristics of the
good together with the properties of the intermediate input. Following the
literature, I will assume that the state is veriﬁable by the contract enforcer ex
post, i.e., at date 2. Let e∗
1 and e∗
2 denote the eﬃcient investment levels for
agents 1 and 2, respectively, assuming that trade takes place; i.e., e∗
1 and e∗
2 are












2, so that production and trade are
indeed desirable. If the parties could foresee the state of nature corresponding to
(e∗
1,e ∗
2) they could simply write this into the contract. That is, in the contract,
they could describe the properties of the intermediate input generated by e∗
2
and specify that, should agent 2 fail to deliver on these properties, he must pay
a penalty to agent 1. Similarly, if agent 1 failed to produce a good with the
characteristics corresponding to e∗
1, he would be liable for a ﬁne payable to agent
2. If these ﬁnes were suﬃciently big, they would induce the agents to make the
eﬃcient investments (e∗
1,e ∗
2), and so an optimal outcome would be induced by
6the contract5.
4 An Optimal Mechanism
It is the assumption that such a “complete” contract is unavailable that moti-
vates the consideration of ownership rights in the incomplete contracts litera-
ture. I will argue, however, that even if a complete contract cannot be written—
because of the impossibility of describing the characteristics and properties in
advance—it should still be possible to reach the optimum through a suitably
designed “mechanism” (at least, if parties are risk averse). The idea is to ex-
ploit techniques from the implementation literature (the mechanism I exhibit
is inspired by Moore and Repullo (1988); see Moore (1992), Palfrey (2001) and
Maskin and Sjöström (2001) for surveys of the literature) to induce the agents
to reveal the values of v and c and then to use this information in place of that
about physical characteristics.
Here is a possible mechanism/contract6 that the agents could sign at date 0
and execute at date 2:
Stage (i). Agent 1 announces b c and agent 2 announces b v (where the hats
5One simplifying feature of this example is that the agents’ investments give rise to a
deterministic state of the world. If instead they generated a nondegenerate probability dis-
tribution over states then we would have to include the investments themselves as part of a
state of the world. Because, however, investment is assumed to be unveriﬁable, agents would
face a double moral hazard problem—and hence would ordinarily be limited to a second-best
outcome, even if indescribability were not an issue.
6I do not wish to suggest that this contract—which I am proposing for pedagogical reasons—
resembles mechanisms that are used in practice. However, more “realistic” institutions, such
as auctions and options, often embody much the same kind of logic. Furthermore, to the
extent that they do not replicate the performance of my mechanism, one must ask why the
market for for institutions has not stepped into the breach, an important unsolved question.
7denote the possibility that the agents may not announce truthfully, i.e., we may
have b c 6= c(e2) or b v 6= v (e1)).
Stage (ii). Agent 1 can “challenge” agent 2’s announcement. If the challenge
is made,
(a) agent 2 must pay a ﬁne f to agent 1, and then
(b) agent 1 oﬀers agent 2 the choice between
(q∗,p ∗) and (q∗∗,p ∗∗),
where
q∗,q∗∗ ∈ {0,1} 7
and
(∗) q∗b v − p∗ >q ∗∗b v − p∗∗.
Note that (∗) implies that agent 2 will choose (q∗,p ∗) if he has been truthful
(i.e., b v = v (e1)).
The challenge “succeeds” if agent 2 chooses (q∗∗,p ∗∗) (since agent 2 is then
s h o w nt oh a v el i e d ) ,i nw h i c hc a s e(q∗∗,p ∗∗) is implemented. That is, agent 1
produces and delivers q∗∗ units of the good (with characteristics corresponding
to the realized state of the world, assumed to be veriﬁable8)f o rp r i c ep∗∗. In
7It may appear that I have “stacked the deck” in favor of an optimal mechanism’s existing
by supposing that parties can determine in advance that they will trade 0 or 1 unit of the
good. But the very concept of a “unit” is ill-deﬁned until the characteristics of the good have
been determined.
8For simplicity, I am assuming that the parties need not specify before delivery the char-
8this case, the mechanism concludes at this point.
The challenge “fails” if agent 2 chooses (q∗,p ∗) (since agent 2 is then shown
to have told the truth), in which case (q∗,p ∗) is implemented, i.e., agent 1
delivers q∗ units of the good with characteristics corresponding to the realized
state and receives price p∗. Furthermore, agent 1 must pay a ﬁne of 2f for
having challenged unsuccessfully. In this case, the mechanism concludes at this
point.
If agent 1 does not make a challenge, then the mechanism moves to Stage
(iii).
Stage (iii). Agent 2 can challenge agent 1’s announcement. Such a challenge
is handled completely symmetrically to that of Stage (ii). And if it occurs, the
mechanism then concludes.
If neither agent makes a challenge, then the mechanism moves to Stage (iv).
Stage (iv). Agent 2 delivers the input with properties corresponding to the
realized state. Agent 1 produces and delivers a unit of the good with character-
istics corresponding to the realized state and receives price p(b v,b c),w h e r e
p(b v,b c)=b v + b c + k
and k is a constant. The mechanism then concludes.
The ﬁrst thing to notice about this mechanism is that, provided that b v is
acteristics corresponding to the realized state; the court could verify for itself what charac-
teristics are appropriate if agent 2 complained about the good he received. More generally,
a mechanism could include an announcement/challenge scheme for characteristics similar to
that for v and c (see Maskin and Tirole (1999)).
9untruthful (i.e., b v 6= v(e1)), it is obvious that we can ﬁnd (q∗,p ∗) and (q∗∗,p ∗∗)
satisfying (∗) such that
(∗∗) q∗v (e1) − p∗ <q ∗∗v(e1) − p∗∗.
Hence, agent 1 can successfully challenge agent 2 if and only if 2 has been
untruthful (from (∗∗), agent 2 would choose (q∗∗,p ∗∗)). Furthermore, if f is big
enough, agent 1 has the incentive to challenge successfully, because he is then
paid f by agent 2. Conversely, he will never make a challenge if agent 2 has
been truthful; in that case, (∗)a n d( ∗∗) cannot simultaneously be satisﬁed, and
so agent 1 would expect any challenge to fail—meaning that, although he would
still collect f from agent 2, he would have to pay a penalty of 2f.
Hence, agent 2 will expect to be challenged and ﬁned if and only if he an-
nounces untruthfully. He therefore has the incentive to set b v = v(e1). Similarly,
agent 1 has the incentive to set b c = c(e2).
To show that agents will be willing to participate in our mechanism and that
it induces an optimal allocation, we need only show that, for i =1 ,2, agent i
wishes to set ei = e∗
i at date 1 and obtains a nonnegative payoﬀ by doing so.
But since agents will be truthful at date 2, agent 1’s date 1 maximand is
p(v(e1),c(e2)) − c(e2) − e1,
which by deﬁnition of p(v,c),e q u a l s
(∗∗∗ ) v(e1)+k − e1.
Notice that, regardless of e2 and k, the maximizing choice of e1 in (∗∗∗ )
10is e∗






2 > 0, we can choose k so that both agents get positive
payoﬀs in equilibrium, completing the argument.
This mechanism may appear to contradict the conclusions of Segal (1999)
and Hart and Moore (1999). These authors present models in which mecha-
nisms such as mine accomplish little9, rather than implement the optimum (as
mine purports to do). The Segal/Hart-Moore arguments rely, however, on the
premise that parties cannot commit themselves to refrain from renegotiating
their contract if, at some point, it is to their mutual advantage to do so.
Maskin and Tirole (1999) contend that this premise is debatable, that there
are ways in which parties who are determined to prevent renegotiation can
succeed in doing so. However, I will not take issue with renegotiation here.
Instead, I will show that, in addition, the Segal/Hart-Moore logic rests critically
on the assumption that parties are risk-neutral.
To see the powerful role that renegotiation can play, consider the ﬁne of 2f
that agent 1 must pay in the mechanism above if his challenge is unsuccessful.
Note that this ﬁne cannot be paid to agent 2; otherwise, the latter would have
the incentive to make the challenge fail (i.e., to select (q∗,p ∗)), even if he had
not been truthful. Hence, the ﬁne must be paid to a third party. But, in that
case, the agents have the incentive to renegotiate just before the ﬁne is paid.
That is, rather than giving away money to an outsider, the agents are better
9In fact, the Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) models introduce suﬃcient “com-
plexity” (in the form of a vast multiplicity of possible states) so that mechanisms accomplish
literally nothing—parties are no better oﬀ with a mechanism than with no contract at all.
11oﬀ if they split the ﬁne between themselves. Yet, if agent 2 gets a signiﬁcant
portion of the split, he may again have the incentive to see that a valid challenge
fails.
This diﬃculty with the ﬁne illustrates a general problem created by the
possibility of renegotiation, viz., that it may be hard to punish one party for
“misbehaving” (e.g., invalidly challenging) without simultaneously rewarding
the other party (and thereby distorting the latter’s incentives).
This is where risk-aversion can help. Suppose that agent 1 is risk-averse and
(to keep matters simple) agent 2 is risk-neutral. Rather than having agent 1









where agent 2 receives the ﬁne. By making g big enough, then in view of
agent 1’s risk-aversion, we can make this stochastic ﬁne as harsh as we like (in
particular, we can make it as bad as a deterministic ﬁne of 2f). Notice, however,
that the ﬁne does not constitute a reward to agent 2 since its mean is zero.
If the realization of the random ﬁne is determined as soon as a challenge
fails10, then renegotiation will not be possible after agent 2 has made his choice.
10This could be arranged by having agent 2 report his choice between (q∗,p ∗) and (q∗∗,p ∗∗)
by depressing the “f” or “s” key, respectively, on a computer keyboard. The computer would
be set up so that depression of the “f” key (for “failed challenge”) would instantly generate a
realization of the randomization between g and −g.
12What, though, about renegotiation beforehand?
If agent 1 has invalidly challenged, then the parties will anticipate that the
challenge should fail, and so indeed will want to renegotiate the random ﬁne
beforehand. Nevertheless, provided that agent 2’s share of the surplus from
renegotiation is bounded away from zero, agent 1’s payoﬀ even after renegotia-
tion can still be driven as low as we like by making g big enough. Thus for a
suitably big value of g, agent 1 will be deterred from making invalid challenges.
On the other hand, if agent 1 has made a valid challenge (i.e., a challenge
satisfying (∗)a n d( ∗∗)a b o v e 11), then, provided that the random ﬁne is not
renegotiated beforehand, agent 2 has no incentive to make the challenge fail
(since his expected payment would then be zero). Indeed, if the challenge is
expected to succeed, there is no value to renegotiating the random ﬁne, because,
this ﬁne will not be expected to arise anyway. Moreover, provided that g is big
enough, agent 1 would veto any proposal for renegotiating the ﬁne (presumably,
both agents must consent for renegotiation to take place), as eliminating the
randomness might give agent 2 the incentive to make the valid challenge fail,
in which case, despite the renegotiation, agent 1 would be worse oﬀ than if it
succeeded (as in the preceding paragraph, g can be chosen big enough to ensure
this). Thus, the possibility of renegotiation beforehand does not interfere with
valid challenges either.
I have argued that a well-chosen random ﬁne will deter agent 1, if risk-
11Once renegotiation is possible, then (q∗,p ∗) or (q∗∗,p ∗∗) might itself be renegotiated
if it is not already eﬃcient. But it is not hard to verify that, as long as b v 6= v (e1) and
v (e1) >c(e2), agent 1 can still devise a successful challenge.
13averse, from challenging invalidly and will not prevent his valid challenges from
succeeding. Symmetrically, the same is true for agent 2. Thus, if both agents
are risk-averse, my mechanism above, amended to incorporate the randomness,
will attain the optimum even in the face of renegotiation.
5C o n c l u s i o n
I have suggested that attributing the incompleteness of contracts to the inde-
scribability of contingencies is theoretically problematic. But as I stated at
the outset, this foundational diﬃculty does not imply that we should ignore the
valuable contributions that the incomplete contracts literature has made. In my
view, we need not wait for completely rigorous foundations to explore the im-
plications of incompleteness, as long as wer e c o g n i z et h ep o t e n t i a lt e n t a t i v e n e s s
of the conclusions.
At the same time, I am certainly in favor of more work directed at founda-
tions, diﬃcult though such an enterprise may be. One can certainly argue that
I have relied exceedingly heavily on agents’ abilities to foresee future payoﬀs
in my treatment of the optimal mechanism above. It may well be too much
to expect that agents can make these forecasts in reality. This suggests that
“bounded rationality” could be a potentially fruitful explanation of incomplete-
ness. Unfortunately, a useful model in which agents’ forecasting abilities are
plausibly and realistically circumscribed seems yet to be developed.
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